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Products Liability-Application of
UCC Sales Article Policy to Leased Chattel

Robert Baker went to a city golf course and leased an electric
golf cart. He was injured when the brakes on the cart failed and it
overturned on him. On a motion for summary judgment, the defendant pleaded a disclaimer of liability clause in the rental agreement.' The trial court ruled for defendant. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, 2 and the plaintiff appealed. Held: reversed. The disclaimer

clause placed inconspicuously in the middle of the golf cart rental
agreement was void as against the public policy of the Uniform Commercial Code. Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971).
Although the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter referred to
as the UCCI sales article does not expressly apply to leased goods,
the Baker court found no material difference between a sale and a
lease.3 The court cited W. E. Johnson Equipment Co. v. United Airlines, Inc.,4 which said:
The reasons for imposing the warranty of fitness in sales
cases are often present in lease transactions. Public policy
demands that in this day of expanding rental and leasing
enterprises the consumer who leases be given protection
equivalent to the consumer who purchases.'
The Baker court further stated that the Washington legislature had
announced a public policy in regard to disclaimers of liability by

The disclaimer was in the middle of the agreement and of the same size
print as the body of the agreement. Thus, it could have been observed only
by reading the entire contract. The disclaimer read as follows: "It is expressly understood and agreed that the lessor shall not be liable for any
damages whatsoever arising from injuries to the person and/or property damage
or loss, of the Lessee arising from the use of, operation of, or in any way
connected with said cart or any part thereof, from whatever cause arising."
Baker v. City of Seattle, 484 P.2d 405, 406 (Wash. 1971).
2 2 Wash. App. 1003, 471 P.2d 693 (1970).
1484 P.2d at 407. Many legal writers have advocated finding an implied warranty of fitness in bailments for hire. The Baker court cited the
following articles that discuss this trend: Farnsworth, Implied Warranties
of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 CoLM. L. R1v. 653 (1957); Note,
Bailee's Rights Against Bailor-A Look At The Developments, 4 WiLLAMI1 rm
L.J. 421 (1967); Note, The Extension Of Warranty Protection To Lease
Transactions, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rnv. 127 (1968).
* 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
5
d. at 100.
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enacting the UCC. It cited subsection (2) of UCC section 2-316'
which states that an exclusion or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability must mention merchantability, and in the
case of a writing, must be conspicuous. The court also cited subsections (1) and (3) of UCC section 2-719' which provides that
consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless it would be
unconscionable to do so and that the limitation of consequential
damages in personal injury cases resulting from the use of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable. 8 The court concluded therefore
that since the disclaimer was contained in the middle of the contract
and was not conspicuous, it would not operate to exclude the defendant's liability.
Other courts have used UCC-derived public policy in non-sales
cases. In the Florida decision of W. E. Johnson Equipment Co. v.
NationalAirlines, Inc.,9 the plaintiff recovered from the manufacturer
of a leased forklift after the lift dropped and injured a wheelchair
6 UCC

§ 2-316(2) reads as follows:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness
the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to
exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for
example, that "there are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
7 UCC § 2-719(1) and (3) read as follows:
(1) Subject to the provisions of (2) and (3) of this subsection and
of the preceding section [§ 2-718] on liquidation and limitation of
damages
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or
in substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or
alter the measure of damages recoverable under this article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy
is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole
remedy.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not.
8 Many courts when applying the UCC to leases use one or more of the
UCC provisions. Most frequently cited provisions refer to implied warranties
of merchantability (UCC § 2-314) or implied warranties of fitness for a
particular purpose (UCC § 2-315). The court may deal with the exclusion

or modification of these warranties (UCC § 2-316) or apply the principles
of unconscionability to the contract (UCC § 2-302).
9 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970).
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passenger. The court applied section 2-31510 but noted that a
warranty of fitness would not arise in all lease transactions." In a
New Jersey case, Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service,'2
the court extended the coverage of a warranty of fitness to the plaintiff-employee when the brakes failed on a truck leased by the plaintiff's employer. In Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Commodore Cosmetique
Inc.,' 3 a New York beauty parlor leased a coffee-making machine
and stopped rental payments when the machine failed to operate
properly. In an action for the rental payments, the defense was
breach of an implied warranty of fitness under section 2-315. The
New York court held that with the placing of the coffee vending
machine went an implied warranty of fitness that the machine would
be suitable for use with a minimal degree of care by the lessee.' 4
0 UCC § 2-315 is an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
and reads as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section [§ 2-316] an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for
such purpose.
" The court listed several factors to consider when deciding whether or
not to apply the UCC to lease transactions. These factors were:
(1) Whether the lessor possessed or should have possessed expertise in the
characteristics of the leased chattel
(2) Whether the lessee's reliance upon the lessor's selection of a suitable
chattel was commercially reasonable
(3) Whether the lessor was a mass dealer in the chattel leased or whether the
transaction was an isolated occurrence
(4) The total commercial setting of the transaction
The court formulated a general rule which reads as follows:
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, where the lessor
has reason to know any particular purpose for which the leased
chattel is required and that the lessee is relying upon the lessor's
skill or judgment to select or furnish a suitable chattel, there is an
implied warranty that the chattel shall be fit for such purpose.
238 So. 2d 100.
12 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
,3 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 164 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1969).
'4 Other cases extending UCC policy to chattel leases include Hertz
Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, Inc.,
59 Misc.2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), in which the court applied
the UCC to a lease with a disclaimer of implied warranty and noted that
the UCC could also be applicable to a bailment. The court said that a disclaimer of warranty clause in the lease would have to conform to UCC § 2-316
as to conspicuous print. In Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428
S.W.2d 46 (1968), the court applied the provisions of the UCC governing
disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability and implied warranty of
fitness to a lease and rendered judgment for the lessee. In both Hertz and
Sawyer the leases were analogous to sales and this may have had some

bearing on the decision. In Sawyer the court strongly emphasized the point

that Pioneer would have sold the machine to Sawyer at the termination of

the lease had a price been agreed upon. In Hertz there were several factors

that made the lease similar to a sale:
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These cases represent a movement toward flexible construction
of statutory law, a trend contrary to the old axiom that statutes conflicting with the common law are to be strictly construed." Perhaps
prophetically, Dean Pound predicted sixty years ago that eventually
statutory law would be looked upon as superior to judge-made law. 6
This forecast seems to be coming true. The Baker case and others
discussed previously have witnessed extension of the policies of a
sales code to leased goods. Some courts have even applied the
policies of the UCC to cases that arose before the UCC became
7
law in those jurisdictions.'

1. The total lease payments over the five year term of the lease were
$6,636.60 while the equipment cost was $5,009.37.
2. The lease was, in effect, renewable forever should the lessee so desire.
3. The lessee had to pay all maintainence, repairs, and taxes incident to
obtaining and use of the machine.
4. The lessee had the right to exclusive use of the machine, at least until it no
longer had any market value.
Some courts have refused to extend the UCC to the non-sales area. A
New York trial court in Busch v. United Aluminum Metal Products Corp., 8
UCC Rep. Serv. 335 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1970) held that a contract for the remodeling
of the plaintiff's kitchen was not a sale, but a contract for work, labor and
services which did not give rise to an implied warranty of fitness. In
Garfield v. Furniture Fair-Hanover, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1004 (N.J. Super
L. Div. 1971), the court held that the plaintiffs could not recover on the theory
of breach of implied warranty since a bailment rather than a sale was involved.
15 Murray, Under the Spreading Anology of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 39 FoRD. L. REv. 447 (1971).
16 Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HAav. L. REv. 383 (1908).
'7See Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1961), in which the New York court accepted the principle of UCC §
2-318 one year before New York adopted it. UCC § 2-318 states:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a
guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in

person by breach of warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit

the operation of this section.
See also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960), in which the New Jersey court accepted the unconscionabiity principle of UCC § 2-302 one year before New Jersey's adoption of the UCC.
UCC § 2-302 reads:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to
avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the

determination.
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The Uniform Commercial Code became law in West Virginia
in 1964.8 The West Virginia court has not yet applied the policy of
the UCC to a bailment for hire. However, in Williams v. Chrysler
Corp., 9 the court intimated what it might do in a situation where the
UCC was not directly applicable, presumably including a non-sale
case. In Williams, a passenger sued the buyer and manufacturer of a
new Dodge automobile and the defendant buyer cross-claimed against
the manufacturer. The accident which gave rise to the suit occurred
in 1959, five years prior to adoption of the UCC. The buyer sued
on the MacPherson v. Buick"0 theory that the supplier of chattels
owed a duty of due care to the ultimate user. The court, although
using a warranty disclaimer to deny recovery, suggested that the
adoption of the UCC may have affected the law significantly. The
court said: "Even if the provisions of the [UCC] were not directly
applicable, we would be among those states 'wherein the doctrine of
public policy was used in connection with allowing implied warranties
to be considered' as stated in the Payne case."2
A later West Virginia case, Nettles v. Imperial Distributors,
Inc.,2 involved a sale made before the UCC became effective in
West Virginia. The court applied the policies of the UCC and held
that there was an implied warranty. 3 The court said:
While the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code are
not applicable to this case, we consider it reasonable to state
that the adoption of that Code by the legislature of this
state, and by legislatures of a great majority of the other
states of the nation, demonstrates that anciently conceived
8

W. VA. CODE ch. 46, arts. 1-10 (Michie 1966).
W. Va. 655, 137 S.E.2d 225 (1964).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
21 Williams v. Chrysler Corp., 148 W. Va. 655, 664, 137 S.E.2d. 225,
231 (1964). The Payne case referred to by the Williams court is Payne v.
Valley Motor Sales, 146 W. Va. 1063, 124 S.E.2d 622 (1962). These two
cases were discussed by Professor Lorensen, in Product Liability and Disclaimers in West Virginia, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 291, 296 (1965). He suggests
that two points emerge from the quoted statement of the court in Williams:
"First, the court indicates that policy implications arise from the adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code which radiate beyond its express terms.
Second, the court suggests that these policy implications bode well for the
consumer."
22 152 W. Va. 9, 159 S.E.2d 206 (1968).
Plaintiffs purchased a mobile
home from defendant who had incorrectly installed some gas fittings in its
stove.2 When plaintiff attempted to light the burners, the stove exploded.
13
Id. The court noted that the sale contract was entered into prior to
the adoption of the UCC in West Virginia and that the circuit court therefor
properly applied pre-UCC law. However, the court distinguished the case from
prior decisions governing implied warranties and the caveat emptor doctrine.
2,9
0 148
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principles relating to implied warranties should be reasonably extended, and that similarly conceived principles
relating to the doctrine of caveat emptor should be reasonably restricted in scope in the light of the vast change in
the nature of chattels commonly sold and purchased in
this day.24
Perhaps the language in Williams and Nettles could be used as a
basis for applying the UCC to non-sales transactions in West Virginia.
Baker v. City of Seattle is an example of an accelerating trend
towards using UCC policy in non-sales cases. Baker and the other
cases like it could provide a strong base for extending UCC policy
to bailments for hire in West Virginia. Its theory should not be
overlooked.
Gary L. Hunt

Taxation-Loss Carry-Back
Privileges of F Reorganizations
An individual owned 123 corporations, each engaged in one
of three activities: supplying building materials, constructing lowcost housing, or marketing houses. These corporations substantially
dealt among themselves and were centrally managed by the Lee
Development Construction Company, Inc. Although each of these
corporations was itself an independent unit, it was also a member
of a larger integrated commercial organization. In 1962 the owner
was seeking continued expansion and merged all the corporations
into Lee Quality Homes Corporation to establish a better credit basis.
Two years later, the corporation changed its legal name to Home
Construction Corporation of America. The only operational changes
caused by the consolidation were adoption of a common tax year
and simplified accounting procedures. The 123 former corporations
became 123 divisions of the Home Construction Corporation of
America.
The parent corporation suffered net operating losses in 1963 and
1964 and filed claims for tax refunds by carrying back the losses "
and setting them off against the taxable income of the 83 previous
24

152 W. Va. 9, 21, 159 S.E.2d 206, 214 (1968).
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